

[00:00:00] **Brian:** Right. So welcome to the, the first dark fox den. We really appreciate having you all here. This was a, a project that we were considering. Again, I mentioned a little bit in the pre-call here. Just the importance of making training available to the people who are, are using it. Also, the idea of being able to, I think, really bring the community together, have some of these conversations.

[00:00:27] One of the things that Jeff and I have been talking about all the way throughout the training as we were building this course and, and setting these things up, was just the importance, sort of finding that balance mark. Between giving you some good content on something, but also leaning into the expertise of the crowd.

[00:00:40] The best kind of programs, I don't know if you feel this way, Jeff, but for me, the best kind of programs are the ones where people ask a ton of questions and they lead and get people thinking creatively and moving outta the box.

[00:00:49] **Jeff:** Absolutely. We have an incredible talent pool today, so we're all gonna learn from each other.

[00:00:54] Mm-hmm, and that's coming from, from the law enforcement guy. Brian's rubbing off on me already.

[00:00:57] **Brian:** That's, yeah. The other day he yes. And, and he's like, Brian, that's a really good idea. Let me just go ahead and say yes. And I'm like, wow. All right. Cool. I have a running joke with magazines and clips that I try to work in.

[00:01:10] We'll see if I can get that in today's program as well. So as I mentioned, I'm coming to you from New Orleans. It's Christmas time here. City's lit up. Very cool. Good place. Got my little Santa Claus there. Kind of going on. Jeff is coming from somewhere else. He will introduce himself in a moment.

[00:01:25] I'll give you a little history on me. Keep it super short. I began as a child and family therapist. Really enjoyed that work. I started to have kids of my own and there was some only so much Play-Doh I could live with in my life before I was like, ah, I need to do something else. So, I ended up moving into

the college space, closing my practice in town, and working more directly with college students.

[00:01:44] At that time, I knew there was a problem. We didn't have a lot of great tools or really things in the college space that could help around the threat assessment or violence risk assessment process. So that's got me interested in it as a New England College and Henniker. Then I moved to Western Kentucky University.

[00:02:00] After that, I spent some time with the NCHERM group and then spent some time with SCN. And now Jeff and I are consulting full-time and talking about these issues in K through 12, workplace, college and really blending. What I, what I love about this program is it kind of speaks to what we do is blending that mix between pre attack behaviors, what we do beforehand, along with how we address those bigger issues as they hit in terms of like building security, what we can do.

[00:02:26] And even then, we won't talk a lot today about any type of tactics that we're at Uvalde, but really more. Could we do to be more effective to avoid something like that? So let me stop introducing myself and pass you to Jeff.

[00:02:37] **Jeff:** Well, welcome everybody, and thank you for taking time out of your busy days to spend a little time with us.

[00:02:42] My name is Jeff Solomon. I'm the National Director of Safety with D-Prep. So I'm originally from Sacramento, California. I retired from the police department out there about. Three years ago I did 30 years total in, in law enforcement 10 in K-12. I was a K-12 chief of police. I did a number of years with a local sheriff's department and finished up with the state university system where I ran the state's critical response unit.

[00:03:05] I served on the statewide behavioral intervention team. Been working with D-Prep now for over 20 years, and one of the passions is. Connecting with Brian over 10 years ago and working with Brian through this. I think the magic here folks is really bringing mental health and law enforcement together, much like multidisciplinary teams in general, and it's, it's been a, a great thing for us.

[00:03:27] So I hope you enjoyed

[00:03:28] **Brian:** today. What we put together here was, you know, really this idea of DarkFox Den was creating something for us. Again, as a group that could come together, talk about some of these threat issues. We built out a, a pretty in-depth calendar of events for about 12 months in the threat space.

[00:03:42] We also built one out called the Pathways Program, looking at Care and Bit team development. So we'll share some links about those. The idea of providing training and offering some of these really content based and discussion based courses is the idea that we're always. And trying to find some new trends, new analysis pieces, and then sharing, you know, with each other as we go forward with this.

[00:04:01] So it's really kind of where we were with this program as we developed it. I, I did wanna mention a website that Jeff introduced me to. I've certainly spent some time studying contagion effects and some of the problems related to talking about that. And it's always good, I think, for any type of threat or violence risk program.

[00:04:17] To start with, the idea of, we're gonna be talking about some pretty difficult things in terms of a campus campus attack, and we wanna make sure that we're not highlighting or I love the phrase here, I think they had it here, the idea of sensationalizing really the, the attacker, the shooter.

[00:04:32] So that's something that we follow. We will not use the, the person's name today or strive not to, but as we look at the details and some of them are, are upsetting, there's some hate speech on. Pictures. So just as a heads up or a trigger warning, want you to be aware that we're, we're gonna dive into this and really have to look at it from that perspective.

[00:04:47] So it can be some difficult work. Again, if you have some issues with that, just you can avert or let us know and we can, we can talk about that in future programs. No, I

[00:04:55] **Jeff:** think it's important. What we know is that the contagion effect after one of these active shooter events or. Is is approximately two weeks and we know that others out there that are thinking about this are watching this, they're watching the reactions, they're feeding off those reactions of the individual's part.

[00:05:11] We know that one of the things that they focus in is watching the pain and the suffering of these individuals. Also, the notoriety that the attackers get through the media. So anything that we can do to minimize this is extremely,

[00:05:24] **Brian:** I. Yeah, it's that kind of blaze of glory piece that we understand as a risk factor too.

[00:05:28] I think when people are feeling like their life isn't worth living and they're struggling, the idea of trying to find some infamy in the, in the loss that they have, and that's, you know, certainly something that we've looked at. I think the media's done better with it, quite frankly. I think they've been really highlighting the people who were killed in attacks.

[00:05:43] Less the attacker, but I think there's been a learning curve. Always room to get better, but that's what you know I see in this field currently. So to this point, we'll jump right in. The first part of this program, I'm gonna talk to you just for a little bit, shooting for about five, 10 minutes here on the idea of what we knew beforehand.

[00:05:58] And I'm gonna show you one system that we have a very straightforward system called Pathways that does essentially an analysis in the K through 12 space. We also have a college version, I'm gonna say. Throughout the program, big tent. So there's other systems, other companies, other ways of looking at this.

[00:06:14] The things that you wanna make sure you have are research driven, that these aren't just people making things up and it's not even making it up, right? Like leaning into their experience maybe a little too hard in their area of expertise rather than looking at what the research is telling us. That's critical when we're looking at this.

[00:06:28] And I also think what, what I've learned over my experience in creating probably, gosh, about eight different expert systems related to threat. One of the things I. The importance of the ability of the user to enter the information easily, that you can have a great tool, but if there's a huge cost, if there's a challenge in terms of how the information's entered, it's not gonna be used.

[00:06:48] And that, that's an issue that I've seen. You know, we see here before the attack kind of social media presence, I think many of us have read this. There's a pdf document that we pulled from about 10 different articles as well as the report things that we've learned and know about the attacker and.

[00:07:05] Thing that led up to the attacks. So that's this part here. And then Jeff will take us into the next, you see here, again, this social media, the connection with each other, the sharing of the information. This reminds me a lot of the Parkland attack where we had, you know, I'm gonna be the next school shooter.

[00:07:20] I'm gonna acquire this bulletproof vest to be able to, you know, be more successful in my attack. Jeff, I'm not law enforcement, but what, what do they call those in the law enforcement community? Yeah, we call those. Yeah. Yeah, for sure. Right. So those like I, I don't know that this is always particularly hard when we look at these things.

[00:07:37] The challenge here is the person that he's texting. How do we make sure that we're advertising and marketing and making sure that they share that concern forward. And that's a lot of the bit and care team work that we do. Thinking about not only. What are we looking at and what's going on, but how's that information get to us and how does it flow through the system?

[00:07:54] Jeff has some great stuff at the end of the program related to some of those, those system failures and how to address them. So we have here, what I would describe a bit was catalyst events that, one of the things that occurred right before this bifurcated attack, it's the technical phrase that occurred in two locations, but the home and then at the school there's a number of attacks like that.

[00:08:13] The clock tower shooting in Texas, being another example. As we look at these attacks where they. Locations we can see often the event. I think San Bernardino is another excellent example of an attack where there was a catalyst event of the offering of a Christmas party to Muslims. Again, I wanna say this really clearly and often as we look at past attacks, past behaviors, we look at this in a audit or a mortality and morbidity or an after action report.

[00:08:37] Every field has its own way of talking about this. We have to lay the blame for the attack at the feet of the person who pulled the. So I think their danger here is that you can hear some of what we're talking about as like the

police did this, or, you know, we missed these clues, and somehow that's the responsibility for what occurred.

[00:08:52] The responsibility lays with this person. Many people have done or experienced horrific things, very, very much. The things that we're gonna talk about here who have not gone forward to be an attacker in this space, many have gone on to. Law enforcement or to be a therapist. So that, that's an important distinction.

[00:09:07] This video clip, maybe it's something that you've heard of. I was able to find this, that I, I think it's useful to see. It does. This is the thing with the dead cat that he was driving through town and had a dead cat in a bag. So again, if you don't wanna see this, it's, it's hard to see the cat. It's in a bag, but they do show it briefly.

[00:09:22] So it's about a, you know, five second clip. But just a heads up, these are all the things that were going on before, opportunities to pick up those pieces of the puzzle or pay attention to those breadcrumbs. You know, as we're moving forward.

[00:09:42] You know this like many other of the risk factors and you can read them in that PDF report. If anyone has trouble getting that, Bethany should be able to help you here on the call. It's on our, our website and how I believe where we summarize across several different domains, the things that we knew about the case, things like the teasing, the bullying.

[00:10:00] The driving around with the cat, the acquisition of weapons his lack of proficiency in weapons. And I, I personally, as I get into this stuff, very much appreciate that. Sometimes there is data and trends that we wanna pay attention to. Things like, you know, someone having a fantasy rehearsal and collecting weapons and mastering the skills to use those weapons.

[00:10:19] Well, there's other times where, in this case it's the exact opposite. There's stories of him dropping the magazine to the floor not knowing how to load it properly. So there's I think we want. Careful about making assumptions. You know, many of these attackers are men. There's certainly female attackers, but the vast majority are male.

[00:10:35] I even think about direct threats. 75% of the time, direct threats are ever acted upon or repeated. That's an interesting statistic. But if you're the

one being threatened, that's gonna feel a little different for you. So our Pathways program here, and we're happy to do a demo or talk to you more about it.

[00:10:49] In fact, we might just give, I think what what we'll do is give demos to anyone on the call today for a month or two, just to kind of see what it's like so you can test it out. This is our triage. And what we have here is a clickable online and mobile platform that when we're looking at this first pass, so we think about the things we knew in this attack.

[00:11:06] The neat thing with this tool is you click on it and it actually pulls up three different categories of risk, and you choose the one that reflects best the category that's going on. So as I look back at the information we know about the attack prior to the attack happening, And some of this, again, was hidden.

[00:11:21] It might have been on his social media or it might have been on his phone. These were interviews with people afterwards. The challenge is, you know, when did we know it? How did we know this? It's part of the, the UVA challenge, I think right now. You know, we heard about the past felony conviction and the concealed carry and the weapons and.

[00:11:37] Although, when did people know it and how much did they know all at once is gonna be part of that case. But for us, what we see here real quick is an overview of things like appearance had gone down, teased and bullied. Home life was difficult. Massive social problems connecting with people not doing well in school to the point that he had left very similar again, I think some of the Parkland attack.

[00:11:58] A sense of depression, frequent mentions of suicide. I'm not gonna see my, you know, past my 18th birthday struggles adjusting to change and the making of threats. You know, some of them transient, that like had very little likelihood of being carried out. These are often on video games. Some of them impulsive when he was angry are times they were more substan.

[00:12:19] So I think a bit more detailed some outbursts. We saw, well, some concerning social media posts, some misogyny that I think existed in that incel space. That's a whole other program. But the idea that inel down or being involuntarily celibate is not so much a, I think a binary piece. You're an in cell or you're not.

[00:12:36] There's a trend and there's a range of this. So you did have a girlfriend, but he has strong misogynistic feelings towards women that he voiced frequent. When you take all of these together and enter them into the system, one of the things I like about Pathways is it gives us a nice report that you can then print save as a P D F, put it into your file.

[00:12:53] So you see here what we have, this triage tool says, Hey, There's enough stuff here that we're gonna rate this at the top level of high, and what we think you should do now is use our Dark Fox assessment. We'll talk about this a little later in the program, but we'll do the next free program. We'll look at this same case, and we'll use Dark Fox like that next level of assessment on that, and that'll be Nina and I in January.

[00:13:18] I'll, I'll share that date with you. So what we found, and this is the piece of the system that we've designed where we'll actually mention all of the things that came up and what we have along with this. I used our K through 12 version, was advice in terms of what you wanna be doing moving forward.

[00:13:33] You know, addressing things like appearance, looking at home, life challenges, how do we address academic work, life issues, issues of depression, suicide, self. So one of the nice outputs of pathways when you enter those concerns is this report. And these are the things I think were applicable in this case.

[00:13:51] So there's, there's many of these, a lot of these things popped up. So, you know, long story short, I think with this case, the big takeaway I have for you is once again, we have a case that escalated down that pathway to violence. To this horrific violence. And we're in a space now where I think there's these, these after action kind of lessons about we knew all of this, why didn't we act more directly with it?

[00:14:16] So this can be part of our conversation as we go forward as we talk about this. But the, the importance here, I think is understanding what we knew and we knew it. And how in the future we can collect these risk factors and be able to bring them forward.

[00:14:29] **Jeff:** Why I'm getting set up, could you just tell us the difference between a triage tool and a threat assessment tool, please?

[00:14:35] **Brian:** Yeah. So if you ever go into your doctor's office, right, and you meet with the nurse or you know, a pond coming into the office, they say, Hey, can we ask you a couple questions? And you're like, sure. You fill out a little. They say have you ever thought of killing yourself? Are you struggling with depression?

[00:14:49] Do you feel hopeless about what comes next? And the way you answer those questions, you know, any of those being yes. Then they make a mark. And then when you go in to meet with a doctor, the nurse, the psych n pd, the therapist, whoever you're meeting with, they would have a heads up. Your risk level based on this triage tool is higher and that we need to bring more of a magnifying glass to those symptoms, a triage tool for like EMTs or for any of us around like a heart attack.

[00:15:15] If I told you my, my left arm feels numb and it hurts when I move it, and it's like there's an elephant sitting on my chest. You've all just triaged. , oh my god, Brian should get to the hospital. So that's exactly what a triage tool is. And when I think about threat assessment in this space, it's so important I think, to understand those differences.

[00:15:34] That we wanna make sure that we're doing this first pass. And this isn't just threat, this would be mental health issues, all these other things as well as the threat. And when we get to that stage that we bring in another level. It's kinda like using like a specialist, you know, if you end up getting referred f from your general practitioner to a dermatologist or someone who specializes in ears, nose, or throat.

[00:15:54] So just a little bit about triage there. Great question, Jeff.

[00:15:56] **Jeff:** Brian, I'm gonna hit you with one more please. Can we discuss a little bit about casting a wider net? Because I think one of the things that we constantly see is the fixation on really looking at threat only versus some of the other things that we see grades dropping.

[00:16:12] Physical appearance going down in, in a, in a K-12 or a higher education setting, or even a subject that the law enforcement maybe is dealing with over time. All of these factors that play into let's broaden our look and get them into that triage tool. Could you just expand on that a

[00:16:26] little

[00:16:27] **Brian:** bit? The, the big part of it is when you look at a bit or care or threat assessment team, you know, part of what we're doing is asking the community to share with us these concerns and like air traffic control.

[00:16:40] As that information comes in, we then, you know, the tower makes a decision about the level of risk and then moves us to the next space. You know, the tower doesn't particularly care that Brian, you know sitting in, in row four F of Southwest flight is allergic to peanuts. There's things that. Are just gonna be a concern of a certain area.

[00:16:58] So we wanna make sure we're doing triage, we understand it's just that. Mm-hmm. , it's more than threat. And then also to your point, Jeff, like overlaps with other things we do. So in the K through 12 space, like PBIS, IEPs and the college, we have retention software like MAP Works or Starfish. So, you know, one of the challenges we.

[00:17:17] Teams when we're talking about how they're triaging something is they might say, oh, we have this other tool for student retention, or, oh, we kind of do that already in our conduct space. And this is something different in that we meet regularly with these teams and as we're triaging cases, we're moving them forward.

[00:17:34] You know, basically making sure that the assessment matches the intervention, which is where all the lawsuits live, by the way. So when a school's looking at getting sued, you know, for behavior related to not handling a case, right? almost every single time. It's because the assessment was here and our intervention was too high or too low.

[00:17:51] The other thing, and I'll, I'm can miss off the 10 seconds on this, Jeff, the other thing is this helps mitigate our bias. So the other thing we wanna be aware of is as we're looking at different cases that we don't at the front door miss something. Because we have a bias maybe a Dunning Kruger effect.

[00:18:09] We overestimate our ability in a space. Or maybe we have like an in-out group bias. Like, oh, I know that kid. He comes from St. Louis Obispo. How's that? I did, did all right with the California . Like, so that, that they're okay. So we make these assumptions. Mary Ellen, a tool called this book that she wrote on a Dangerous Instincts.

[00:18:26] So the idea of sometimes our instincts aren't right and we have to pay attention to. So that was not 10 seconds, but I did my best. So thanks Jeff. I'll turn back over to you.

[00:18:35] **Jeff:** Perfect. So we're gonna move into a little bit about what happened on the day of May 24th, and get into some of the why these things happened in, in our view.

[00:18:46] I'll just give everybody a quick caution again adult themes here. One of the things that Brian and I don't do is we don't show pictures of dead bodies graphic content, like people getting killed, that type of stuff. We know that that does nothing for the adult. Process. So we really wanna make sure that what we're delivering is not that shock and awe, but actual information that'll help all of you in your everyday work.

[00:19:08] The two reports that are out on Robb Elementary that we're aware of right now, Are out of the alert group, which is Texas State University, although it's a state university, is not a law enforcement agency with subpoena power and those type of things. This report came out very quickly after the event. It was a little concerning I think, to both Brian and I when we looked at how fast this is July that this this report came out.

[00:19:31] They didn't have quite the access that the second report that we looked. Out of the Texas House of Representatives on July 17th that was a little bit more comprehensive and I think that is the better of the two, both of which are up on our website or they will be up on our website if they're not.

[00:19:48] The reports were created using body camera testimony, witnesses of the officers witnesses that were on scene, and the investigators afterwards. A little kind of perspective here is, this is gonna be a high level kind of review of this and some of the whys. As I mentioned earlier I'm focusing predominantly on the K-12 side of this, not the law enforcement side, but I need to be very clear upfront is I have a lot of issues with.

[00:20:18] Command how this was run on a command level from the police perspective, but we're focusing more on the school and what the school could do better out of this. Just to give you a little bit of understanding that there were at least 376 law enforcement officers there that day. It's a lot, and that was part of the reason.

[00:20:38] I'd like to think in some of the other states in, in California we call off officers on that we don't allow what's called self deployment to huge events like this. I'll also say that this reports are, the reports shouldn't be considered definitive or final. We're still an investigative process here, so please understand that this information.

[00:20:58] Change a at, you know as we get new information, as people remember things differently or decide to be more truthful in testimony as we're seeing with some of the leadership things coming out now. So I'm gonna go through the timeline again at a high level here and really kind of go over this and then talk about.

[00:21:17] In, in our thoughts of why some of these things happen and what we've seen working with school, school districts and higher education facilities nationwide, and some of the things that we think we can do about it to to fix it. So the day started off in May 24th with the suspect shooting his grandmother in the face over his phone taken away on the left hand side in the big red circles where his grandmother's house is in proximity to the school.

[00:21:43] So very close. Also, he told everybody he was gonna do this, so there's a ton of leakage in this case. You know, he put it out at least to to several people, one of which was overseas, where he said, I just shot my grandmother in the head. I'm gonna go shoot up an elementary school. The reply back, which was deleted in this texturing was cool.

[00:22:02] So sit on that for a minute. So times are what we got out of the report, and so listen, you, let's use 'em in, in, you know, proximity approximate. At 1127, a female teacher exits the exterior door of the West Hall, propping it open with a rock. So let me just start There is there was a lot of misconceptions at the early stages of this.

[00:22:24] And I really, well, Brian and I were giving this briefing early on. Literally this woman was blamed for this event happening. And what we'll get into later is that it's never just one single event that causes these things. When we talk about systems thinking and group think there's a whole chain of events that made this worse than it probably could have been.

[00:22:41] Should we have done other things in this event? The culture at this school was to prop the doors open using a pile of rocks that were outside each one. They were painted by the children to make 'em a little bit more you know

friendly if you will, and recognizable. So the students would paint these rocks and they would be piled up outside.

[00:22:59] It was against policy, it was against their, their written policy and their procedures for the school. The west hallway should have had all of the doors closed, with the exception of one. It's, they use what's called that primary entrance mode. The suspect left his house and at 1128, the suspect becomes involved in a motor vehicle accident crashing his car in the canal behind.

[00:23:21] The the school, as he emerges from the vehicle, he starts shooting at a couple of onlookers that were next door at a mortuary. Those were the first set of gunshots that we're aware of at 1129. The female teacher returns back through that doorway, slamming that door close, but because of a mechanical problem, she, she remembered to close the door and it was locked.

[00:23:44] The door just didn't latch and close so it was left unfortunately open because of a mechanical failure. That's the information that's out right now at 1130, the suspect wearing dark clothing, carrying a bag, left the crash scene, hopped over a chainlink fence into the elementary school property. I wanna note that Brian and I do a lot of work around the country regarding.

[00:24:05] What's called threatened vulnerability risk assessments. Looking at how do we target hardened schools as one part of the process along with all the other things that we do, along with the multidisciplinary teams, et cetera. As a little data point, there's a great report out about fences that a five to six foot cyclone fence.

[00:24:24] Only delay somebody about four seconds. And that was very clear in this incident that the individual just jumped over the fence, was able to get in. So probably not even worth the money that that fence was put up to, you know, to protect. At 1131, the suspect is captured on tv CCTV, between the cars and the building, and it's where he begins to shoot.

[00:24:44] This is a little different than most shooters. Most shooters wait till they actually get inside. The reason for that is they believe, or we know, is that the clock starts when they pull that trigger and law enforcement gets notified. On average, the alert think tank outta Texas state university puts law enforcement response at about three minutes to an active shooter event.

[00:25:08] So they gotta get in there quick. So this was a little bit rare. There's only a few instances where we know the shooter actually starting from the outside, outside working their way. 1132, the suspects fired through the windows into that west most rooms little picture here, and then enters the school from the exterior door where the teacher closed it and slammed it, but it didn't lock.

[00:25:33] Okay, suspect enters the west hallway and goes down between rooms one 11 and one 12. What I will tell you is that there's some confusion of which room was entered first. So he stood in front of the doors and it was hard to see on the camera and really understand from the witness testimony, which, which room the suspect actually entered.

[00:25:51] Was it one 11 or one 12? I don't think it really matters. Our purposes today, but he fired a series of rounds from the hallway in the direction of the classrooms. He made entry at about 1133 into rooms 11 or or one 11 or one 12, and began shooting. So from those first shots at 1128 to when he made entry into that classroom.

[00:26:15] Just a couple of minutes here just to give you an idea of how fast these. Are happen. So I, it really drives home one of the primary things that we say for schools and universities, office complexes, that we start from the lockdown and that we don't go to scramble to go lock our doors. So I really wanna highly emphasize how important that is keeping our doors locked, which again was the policy of the Uvalde School district.

[00:26:42] At 1133, the shooter backed out of those rooms and fired rounds from the hallway into the classrooms. He went back in and continues to fire over a hundred rounds by 1136. And these are all timestamped and heard through the CC T V very shortly after then, which is. Kind of in line with that three minute response, the Uvalde PD and the rest of the group enters through the west doors into the hallway.

[00:27:11] Again, I don't want to get into the tactics or why the why knots but that was the little bit of the timeline over overview for you. Talking a little bit about some of the features of the school itself. This was the schematic of room L111 and 112. You can see if you were standing here at the bottom of the doorway, how it would've been confusing to see which actual doorway the, the suspect entered.

[00:27:37] First there's also an interior pathway door. Brian and I did a, a very large set. Threatened vulnerability risk assessments for a middle school group out in California over the summer. Some, somewhere in the round of 12 of these schools we were, were doing, and almost every one of the school site had these pass through doorways, some of which didn't have locks on 'em.

[00:27:57] So if you get into one classroom, you're able to move between the two and have multiple groups of people as targets. Here, this is what the actual front door of one of the classrooms looked like. These are good doors. These are steel core doors, and they have the mesh in the, the, what I call the archer windows there.

[00:28:19] I think one of the things that we like to see with this is to take away what's called target. Acquisition, somebody shouldn't be able to walk up and look inside. There's been multiple incidences, including Sandy Hook and Parkland, where the shooter stood outside the door before they moved in, and were able to acquire targets through this window and shoot from there into the classroom.

[00:28:40] So Brian and I also talk about things like having a safer corner. Every classroom, every office should have a, for lack of a better term, more safe location inside your classroom to move to designated by some type of marker. Like a blue star or your official mascot for that particular. Here's some pictures of the windows outside.

[00:29:01] As the gunman came in and made his way around to that west hall door, he was firing in. Again, something that is rare, so, I just want to kind of scratch the surface on the why with this. We wanna get away from the blame game and with this, cuz there's, there's a lot to go around here, but what I can tell you from this, much like the aviation industry, law enforcement and hospitals, these high state type of industries, and I'm throwing education into this group.

[00:29:35] The research really shows that airstone occurs a result of one big mistake. The teacher left the door open. That's not what happened with this. Okay. Instead, what we see is small mistakes here and small mistakes there. Alright. These could have been mitigated if any one of these things would've been different throughout this process.

[00:29:55] I don't think we would've been able to stop this individual, but we would've been able to slow 'em down drastically if we would've had a different perimeter fence, if we would've had a process for follow up. on the work orders that were put into the principle. In fact, there was no work order that was put in.

[00:30:11] It was verbally told instead of following the policy on this. So there's a lot of things that could have been done differently. These mistakes add up to these catastrophic results. Some of doer's work back in, in the mid nineties. There's a great b book out there called The Logic of Failure Block, black Box Thinking by Matthew sae, that we really lean on for a lot of this amongst a lot of other research and data points.

[00:30:38] So a lot of the failure here is around campus culture, the training and policy, technology and leadership. So I'm gonna gonna finish up by just kind of going through a couple of these thoughts, is that the communication was an issue on campus. It was widely known that both internet and cell phone didn't work on a lot of critical areas like the playground, parking lot, certain areas in the building.

[00:31:02] And it was left that way. It was left with, it was known, but it wasn't gonna get fixed for a variety of reasons that contributed. The lockdown process not getting out to everybody and people being alerted the culture of propping open doors. It was widely known throughout not only the school, Rob Elementary, but the district as a whole, that this was an acceptable process, which was directly against policy.

[00:31:29] No work order was actually submitted for room 11. It also had a defective door. It would lock, but it also wouldn't pull close. So if you slammed the door or closed the door fast that it wouldn't actually latch and go into place. Teacher reported it to the principal but really didn't follow the work order policy and nothing lever followed through.

[00:31:48] It was also widely known in the school that there was a key shortage and it really led to the substitutes not being issued keys and having access to that. Which was a problem. So one of the things that we talk about is kind of changing the culture of the school. Understanding that we're gonna make mistakes and really evaluating these mistakes and getting better that.

[00:32:11] That the old adage that failure is not an option is just bs, is that we're gonna make mistakes, we're gonna fail, whether it's, you know, in our multidisciplinary team, process bit care, that type of stuff, and threat assessment, or it's in reviewing our day-to-day activities as it relates to security around a campus.

[00:32:29] We wanna make sure that we have open and honest reporting and evaluation of errors and come back and put some reforms into place. Just a little bit on systems thinking. You know, in the short term, what we're really looking at is implementing a comp a continuous improvement model of air review.

[00:32:48] When we see things that were done incorrectly or could be do doing better, we want to constantly be looking at how we can fix that. This model really requires this investigation and reflection upon these heirs and near misses or other mistakes, and we have to know that it's okay to be able to do this, all right?

[00:33:07] That making mistakes is okay. And what we do know out of the research and our work around the country is that organizations that aren't willing to really have this error review perpetuate groupthink. And you know, unfortunately when we get into this area of group think and I, I used to, when I, when I was a K-12 chief of police, I used to hear this from my boss all the time, was that no news is good news.

[00:33:29] Like, let's not get out that information. Let's not put that out to the masses. You know, and you know, This idea of groupthink discourages workers from openly reflecting upon or criticizing the work of other coworkers or their superiors to be able to get better, to be able to fix things or processes.

[00:33:48] There's a great. You know, amount of models that are out there that really address this. The Toyota production system or t p s model is just one of those. If anybody has a problem on that production line, observes an air, that person basically reaches up, holds the big red handle, or accord and halts production.

[00:34:09] What that initiates is a team of supervisors that run over, look at the problem, troubleshoot the problem. Work with that employee to fix the problem so that we're not having these production line problems perpetuate and move down the line.

[00:34:27] Sorry, I was just checking the chat here. One of the things that we know here is if a culture is open and honest about its mistakes, the entire system can learn from it. We all learn from reviewing these after action reports. We need to be doing that with the small things as well as the. Near misses, mistakes, errors that we have on a campus and really change that culture that is so much on not making a mistake or not disclosing mistakes.

[00:34:58] And we have learned a lot from the aviation industry and the hospital industry on coming clean on these things and getting better at them. So we don't have these mistakes in the future. Brian with that, I think I kept, kept it pretty close to my time limit.

[00:35:17] **Brian:** Yes, you are. Great. That's good. Yeah, let's drop out of screen share here and we can check in with the group.

[00:35:22] Before we, let me do this first. I wanna, I do wanna respect folks time on this, so we'll have I'll share this first with you and then we'll kind of move forward with that. So one of the things that's important for Jeff and I especially, is this coming up. Okay. I was, are you able to see feedback?

[00:35:36] Perfect. One of the things that's useful for us is to make sure that we hear back from you about how this first program went, if it was useful or not. I'll just be completely candid with you. One of the things that we were talking about was the difference between sort of a content delivery versus a more open discussion.

[00:35:51] I think for each program that we. That'll shift a little bit. And I think for today what I would suggest is we're gonna hang around for the next 15 minutes. I hope we can have a discussion. That would be terrific. I'll actually shut the recording off and be able to talk if you are able to stay, if you can't.

[00:36:07] Understandable. I think for the next time we do the program, depending on the level of content we wanna share, we'll, you know, kind of adjust that going forward. So, and we'll also take into account feedback. So we wanna hear you. On that particular issue. The next one we're doing, we're gonna take the same case at Uvalde and I wanna, you know, you saw sort of how the triage tool would handle it.

[00:36:27] Let's say that it went to the DarkFox tool or another threat assessment tool, and then we can look at that in a little more detail and talk

about, what I would suggest is a really nice model six stage model to go through when you're doing a threat case from organizing the thematic data. To developing a risk factor, a protective factor list, and then coming up with a strategy of, of violence and potential.

[00:36:49] So we'll go through all of that next time with Nina and I. The other ones that we're doing we have one on suicide that's coming up that's very useful. This is part of that Bit/Care series. And we also have some great conferences coming up as well. We have one that we're doing with Belmont University in Nashville.

[00:37:07] Well, it says K through 12. You know, bring in sort of violence risk assessment into the K through 12 space. That'll be a great application of this. And we're just announcing now a, a conference in sunny Florida in February. That we'll be offering. And Jeff and I are gonna follow this model of us doing the morning on threat assessment.

[00:37:24] Like what do we look for prior to the attack and then the afternoon, spend some time really getting into how we can think about, you know, active assailant response, target hardening, and how we kind of bring these both together to be effective. So that's what we have today. I'm gonna shut off the recording and what I'd love to do is just kind of open it up for folks if you have questions or chat.